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THE LEGAL ISSUES OF "PARA-WAR" AND
PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
YORAm DINSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION

History books reveal that, throughout the era of the Roman
Republic, extending over five centuries, the gates of the Temple of
Janus were closed to symbolize the reign of real peace only once, when
the first Punic War ended.' If the same method were used in our own
days as a token of genuine peace in the Middle East, it is doubtful
whether the contemporary gates would have been dosed at any time
during the past five decades. Arabs and Jews have been locked in mortal
conflict for more than two generations and no end to their enmity
seems to be in sight. This is important to bear in mind, if only to
benefit from the sobering effect of historical perspective. Clearly, if
there were an easy and simple way of reconciling the antagonists in the
Middle East, an accord would have been achieved long ago. That the
struggle continues is indicative of the complexity of the situation and
the enormity of the problems involved. Nevertheless, history also demonstrates that disputes, however intricate and protracted, can be resolved as circumstances change. It is the duty of the statesman to steer
a course that will ultimately write finis to hostilities; it is the task of
the lawyer to chart for the statesman the shifting channel of human
conduct sanctioned by international law. It is proposed here to examine
the legal issues underlying the explosive state of affairs extant in the
Middle East today, with a view toward analyzing curative measures
designed to alleviate the present crisis.
FORCE: TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES

A. The Cycle of Force
In the latter part of 1969 - more than two years after the Six Day
War, twenty-one years after the establishment of the State of Israel, and
fifty-two years after the Balfour Declaration 2-Arab governments still
refuse to accept and apply the basic tenet of sovereign coexistence with
* Consul of Israel, New York. M. Jur., Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1958; LL.M.,
New York University, 1961; Dr. Jur., Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1964. The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the Government of Israel. This article
expands on the themes of two papers submitted, respectively, to the Hammarskjold Forum
and the American Bar Association.
1 See I. Lavy, A HIsTORY OF RoME, 67, 69 (6th ed. B. Foster transl. 1961).
2 See L. STEIN, THE BAiLoUR DECLARATION (1961).
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Israel, attempting instead to drive the Jews into the sea. Almost as a
daily exercise, regular army units of the Arab countries open fire across
the borders of Israel, and bands of marauders and saboteurs, aided and
abetted by the Arab governments, try to sow terror and disrupt
life within the State. Israel, which has no intention whatsoever of succumbing, responds to the mounting tide of attacks by multiplying its
counterattacks, both along its borders and deep inside Arab territories.
The maddening cycle of force and counterforce frustrates the lofty
aspirations of mankind, and apparently inhibits lawyers from dissecting
the legal issues related to this "para-war." 3 Yet there is method in the
madness of using force, and from a legal viewpoint it is imperative to
draw a line of distinction between the permissible and the prohibited.
B. The Law of the Charter
As a rule, current international law clearly prohibits the use of
force in the relations between States; the Charter of the United Nations 4 solemnly declares this interdiction:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial iritegrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations. 5
Indeed, under the Charter, recourse to force is permitted only in two
instances: (a) within the framework of the collective security system
created by the United Nations, i.e., in the implementation of enforcement measures duly undertaken by the Organization, 6 and (b) in selfdefense against an armed attack, in accordance with article 51 of the
Charter,7 which proclaims:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
3 This term was coined by Maxwell Taylor. See I0 M.
NATIONAL LAW
-1 U.N.

OF

23 (1968) [hereinafter M.

"wHITEMAN,

DIGEST OF INTER-

WHITmAN].

CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.

5 Id. For the proper interpretation of this clause, see G. SCHwARZENBERGER, THE LA-W
Aaml.w CONFLICT 51 (1968). Admittedly, paragraph 4 of article 2 relates only to United

Nations members, but paragraph 6 extends the scope of the proscription on the use of
force by stipulating: "The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members

of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary
for the maintenance of international peace and security." Kelsen draws the conclusion

that the meaning of the latter provision is that "the Charter claims to be valid for states
not contracting parties to this treaty." H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 348
(Ist ed. 1952).
6 U.N. CHARTER, ch. VII [arts. 39-50].
7 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take
at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain
or restore international peace and security.8
The concept of self-defense, as enunciated in article 51, is extremely
controversial. It is easier, however, to perceive the meaning of that
provision when notice is taken of the conspicuous absence of two very
significant and commonly employed phrases, namely, war and aggression.
C. Interceptive Self-Defense
While aggression is a very broad term, which has come to mean
different things to different people, the expression "armed attack," as
it appears in article 51, is somewhat limited in scope. Aggression alone
(but not armed attack) covers, inter alia, a mere threat of war, in
which case a response by way of self-defense would be anticipatory in
character. 9 Since such a threat is not equivalent to an actual armed
attack, preventive countermeasures are not justifiable under article
51. Admittedly, there is a strong school of thought adhering to the
view that the article explicitly emphasizes only one type of legitimate
self-defense, i.e., the repulsion of an armed attack, without negating
other types preexisting under customary international law, i.e., resistance to aggression in its several manifestations."0 However, this interpretation simply does not comply with the letter and spirit of the
Charter, and consequently has been rejected by most authorities."
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the expression "armed attack" encompasses more than the clear-cut cases of commencement of hostilities.
For example, suppose that the DEW line electronically warned the
United States that intercontinental ballistic missiles had been launched
by State X against it. Suppose further that the Strategic Air Command
(SAC), reacting instantly, directed bombers previously cruising in
8 Id.
9 On anticipatory self-defense, see I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF

FORCE BY STATES 225-26 (1963).

10 See D. BowrT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-92 (1958); M. McDouGAL
& F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 232-41 (1961); WValdock, The
Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in InternationalLaw, 81 REcuEu, DEs
COURS DE L'AcADLMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 451, 498 (1952).
11 See H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNrrEm NATIONS 797-98 (1950); MANUAL OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 767 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968); 2 L. OPPENHSm, INTERNATIONAL LAW 156

(7th ed. H. Lauterpacht ed. 1952); Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article
51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 ANr. J. INT'L L. 872, 877-78 (1947).
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routine holding patterns to attack military targets in State X before
the alien missiles struck their intended targets. Would it be said that,
since, technically speaking, the SAC planes attacked first, the United
States did not engage in self-defense authorized by the Charter? Similarly, suppose that the Japanese bombers en route to Pearl Harbor
had been successfully intercepted and shot down before they actually
managed to alter the balance of power in the Pacific. Would such action
on the part of the United States have been interpreted as the initiation
12
of an armed attack?
It is quite obvious that an actual armed attack may be initiated before the first shot has been fired. It is the embarkation upon an irreversible course of inevitable action, the crossing of the Rubicon rather than the actual fighting -that casts the die and consummates
the armed attack. Common sense requires that responsive measures
undertaken at the inception of an attack be regarded as legitimate selfdefense authorized by the Charter. It is inconceivable that the defending State should have to sustain and absorb a devastating, perhaps
overwhelming, strike merely to prove a legal point. To all intents
and purposes, self-defense in such circumstances is not anticipatory;
it is simply miraculously early.
The foregoing discussion is particularly relevant to an analysis
of the legality of the Six Day War. An examination of the fateful fortnight that preceded the outbreak of actual hostilities between Egypt
(joined later by other Arab countries) and Israel discloses that Egypt
was slowly but surely mounting a massive armed attack; and Israel
responded in the nick of time with swift and successful self-defense.
True, no single Egyptian step during May and June of 1967 can be subsumed per se under the heading of armed attack, but the series of
actions undertaken at that time must be analyzed in the light of their
cumulative effect. These actions included: (a) the unequivocal, and
well-nigh incredible, saber-rattling statements of Egyptian (and other
Arab) leaders; (b) the peremptory ejection of the United Nations Emergency Force from the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, after a decade
of relative stability in that theater of operations; (c) the illegal closure
of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping; 13 and especially (d) the largescale build-up of Egyptian forces along Israel's borders. This was not
an ordinary deployment of forces; apart from the unprecedented dimen12 The Pearl Harbor example was adduced in debates in the United Nations. See 5

M. WHrrEMAN 867-68.
13 On the juridical issues pertaining to the closure of the straits, see Gross, Passage
Through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, 33 LAw 9. CoNrMap. PROB. 125-46
(1968).
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sions of the troops, guns, tanks and planes pouring into Sinai, it was
impossible to disregard either the proliferation of border incidents that
ensued or the tell-tale disposition of assault units. Ground troop movements, particularly in the beginning of June, resulted in ominous
intelligence evaluations indicating the imminence of a spearhead strike
designed to split the Israeli Negev. Persistent encroachments on Israeli
airspace by Egyptian planes, and battle orders (which came into the
14
hands of the Israel Defense Forces and were subsequently published)
issued to Egyptian advance squadrons to prepare for the launching of an
attack within a very short while, round out the picture. The net result
of all these sinister developments was that early in June of 1967, Israel,
and, indeed, most of the world, considered Egypt as practically engaged
in the first phase of an inevitable armed attack. Under these circumstances, the Israeli response must be regarded not as preventive or preemptive, but rather as interceptive in character, bearing a striking similarity to the two hypothetical cases previously discussed. Jordan, Syria
and the other Arab States that rushed in to wage war on Israel in collaboration with Egypt were simply participating in an armed attack. On
the part of Israel, therefore, the Six Day War, factually ineluctable, was
also legally justifiable as an inescapable act of self-defense and self-preservation. 15
Furthermore, inasmuch as self-defense under the Charter is authorized only pending appropriate action by the Security Council,
weight should be accorded to the fact that attempts made at the United
Nations to ascribe responsibility to Israel for initiating hostilities in
June 1967 were uncompromisingly rebuffed. 16
D. The Options of Self-Defense
In view of the fact that the cycle of force in the Middle East continues to accelerate, it is interesting to examine the applicability of
the Charter to the skirmishes and encounters that incessantly occur
between Israel and the Arab States. In this context, it is important to
note that the term "armed attack" need not be confined to an onslaught by the bulk of the armed forces of one State against another;
small-scale armed attacks are still armed attacks.' 7 By the same token,
self-defense can assume more than one form. The expression "self14 See THE ARAB WAR AGAINST ISRAEL 19-28 (1967).
15 This conclusion is also reached, after a detailed analysis, by J. STONE, Tm MMrLE
EAST UNDER CEAsE-FIRE 2-10, 14 (1967).
16 See Rosenne, Directions for a Middle East Settlement -Some
Underlying Legal
Problems, 33 LAw 8- CONTEMP. PROB. 44, 55-56 (1968).
17 "If 'armed attack' means illegal armed attack it means, on the other hand, any
illegal armed attack, even a small border incident." Kunz, supra note 11, at 878.
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defense" by itself is not descriptive in sense; rather, it is merely a term
that is attached to a certain rightful course of action which involves
counterforce and which is undertaken by States in appropriate cases.,'
Simply stated, self-defense, like its counterpart term "armed attack," is
not restricted to extended contests and total engagements. By way of
illustration, suppose that an Israeli patrol, moving along the border on
the Israeli side of the line, is subjected to intense fire from the other
side - in violation of the Charter 9 as well as the cease-fire - and
suffers heavy casualties. Until the Security Council has taken the necessary measures to restore the peace, the following categories of counterforce are permissible under article 51:
1. Reaction
The dimensions of the first category are somewhat elusive, since
very few lawyers, as distinct from soldiers, take special cognizance of it.
For lack of a better name, it may be termed reaction. The idea is countering force with force on the spot and on the spur of the moment. In the
above example, fire would be returned by the patrol, and possibly by
supporting units in that sector of the line. The significant characteristic
of reaction is that the exchange of fire terminates the incident, thereby
avoiding the involvement of other units at other times.
2. Reprisal
Reprisal means the use of force to retaliate for a previous armed
attack by another State when no other redress has been obtained. It is
to be distinguished from mere reaction in that an altogether different
incident develops, either with a separate unit or at another time or
both. Thus, in the above example, Israeli troops would either open
fire at a later date on an enemy patrol, or attack a military base from
which the assailants came. Nonetheless, reprisal is still limited in scope,
inasmuch as the response does not entail the use of force b l'outrance,
and must be proportional to the initial, illegal, use of force by the opposing side.20
Many international lawyers firmly believe that reprisal does not
fall within the ambit of legitimate self-defense under article 51 of the
Charter.2 1 In fact, this point of view has been upheld by a number of
18 "Self-defense is a kind of self-help." H. KELsEN, supra note 5, at 16.
10 U.N. CHARTER art. 2.
-20 This principle was laid down by the 1928 Arbitral Award in the Naulilaa case

(Portugal v. Germany), 2 U.N.R.I.AA. 1011, 1026 (1949). For a clear exposition of the
Naulilaa case, see J. BRm~, Tm LAw oF NATIONS 400-02 (6th ed. H. Waldock 1963).
21 See I. BROWNLm, supra note 9, at 281 (and authorities cited therein).
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United Nations resolutions. 22 However, there are authorities who take
a contrary position, 23 and, in any event, the fact of the matter is that
States regard reprisals as far from pass9. Indeed, all major powers have
had recourse to reprisals in recent years, to wit, the United States in the
Gulf of Tonkin, 24 the United Kingdom in Danaba, 25 France in

Sakhiet, 26 and the Soviet Union in the Chinese border incidents. 27
Thus, it is not at all surprising that one commentator has reached the
following conclusion:
It seems clear that on the doctrinal level Israel is not entitled to
exercise a right of reprisal in modern international law. Such clarity, however, serves mainly to discredit doctrinal approaches to legal
analysis. 28
International law is created and determined by the practice of States not by lawyers, regardless of their erudition and expertise, or by the
misguided resolutions of nonlegislative bodies. Efforts to institute textbook tenets of international law, confusing the lex lata with the lex
ferenda and widely ignored by States, only serve to perpetuate the layman's belief that the international legal system is a chimerical notion.
Even in terms of sheer rationality, since war, the ultimate weapon,
is generally accepted as a legitimate form of self-defense (in response to
an armed attack), it is incomprehensible that the use of a lesser weapon,
a part rather than the whole, should be regarded as objectionable. If war
is a permissible form of self-defense under article 51 of the Chapter, a
fortiori measures short of war, or more specifically, reprisals, are also
permissible.
3. Execution
Like reaction, the third category of self-defense is not always recognized as an independent mode of counteraction. Although it is
occasionally designated necessity, 29 the term "execution" seems preferable. It signifies the retributive employment of force within the terri22 For a recent example, see S.C. Res. 270, 24 U.N. SCOR, 1504th meeting 1 (1969).
23 See, e.g., MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 754: "armed
reprisals that are taken in self-defence against an armed attack are permitted." See also

E.

COLBERT, RETALIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
24 See 14 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARcHIvES

202-03 (1948).
20,241 (Aug. 22-29, 1964) [hereinafter KEE-

SING'S].

25See 11 KEESING'S 15,502 (Apr. 20-27, 1957).
26 Id. at 16,203 (May 31-June 7, 1958).
27 Cf. 17 KEEsING'S 23,314 (Apr. 26-May 3, 1969).
28 Falk, The Beirut Raid and the InternationalLaw of Retaliation, 63 Am. J. INT'L L.
415, 430 (1969).
29 See 1 L. OPPENHEIA1, INTERNATIONAL LAw 298-99 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955).
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tory of another State directed against individuals who have committed
acts of force on their own responsibility, i.e., without the complicity of
their government. Execution is similar to reprisal, except that it is
not directed against a government, and usually occurs only when a
government is unable or unwilling to control the situation along its
border. For example, it might be utilized where an Israeli patrol is
attacked, not by the regular troops of a neighboring Arab country, but
by a band of marauders whose base is located in that country (obviously, if the marauders were abetted by the authorities, the legal
position in respect of governmental responsibility would be equated to
the use of regular troops). Execution would be accomplished, for
instance, if an expeditionary force was sent to eliminate the saboteurs'
camp across the border.
The most famous historical precedent for this type of self-defense
is to be found in the Caroline case.30 In 1837, during the McKenzie
Rebellion in Canada, a large number of Canadian insurgents, as well
as unauthorized American citizens sympathetic to their cause, gained
control of an island on the Canadian side of the Niagara River. The
steamboat Caroline was used to transport men and materials from the
American bank to the rebel-held island. When British protests failed
to sever the line of supplies, a British unit crossed the American border
under cover of night, boarded the vessel and sent her drifting to the
Falls. In the course of the incident, several American citizens were
killed and others were injured. The United States, alleging a violation
of American sovereignty, lodged a protest with the British government,
and the British, in turn, contended that they had acted in self-defense.
Subsequently, Lord Ashburton, a special British envoy, was dispatched
to Washington to settle the controversy. In a note addressed to him,
Secretary of State Webster, discussing the British assertion of selfdefense, maintained that the "necessity of that self-defence... [must be]
instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment
for deliberation." 31 Lord Ashburton's reply apparently satisfied the
United States, and the case was dosed. But Webster's criterion made
history and came to be viewed as transcending the specific circumstances
of the episode - meaning the issue of execution - and applicable to
self-defense in general. 32 Even in our own time, the International
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg applied Webster's test as a basis for
80 See Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 Am. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938).

312 T.

MooRE, A Dxas.r OF INTERNATIONAL L-w 412 (1906).
32 Jennings, supra note 50, at 92, calls the Caroline case the "locus classicus of the

law of self-defence."
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evaluating, and rejecting, the German allegation that the invasion of
Norway had come under the aegis of self-defense.38
4. War
War, as a measure of self-defense, denotes a full-scale use of
counterforce. Unlike reprisal, war, once launched, does not have to
be proportional to the force initially employed by the enemy. It is of
the essence of war that (subject to the rules of conduct in warfare,
i.e., the jus in bello) all acts designed to effectuate the overall collapse
of the enemy are permissible."4 By way of illustration, after Pearl
Harbor the United States could, and indeed did, seek the unconditional surrender of the enemy, and not merely retribution for
the severe blow to its naval power. However, inasmuch as war is
the ultimate means of destruction, it is clear that not every isolated
instance of an armed attack by one State gives the other party a
right to plunge into all-out war in self-defense. It is here especially
that Webster's yardstick may be relied upon for measuring the justifiability of self-defense. Yet, if his words are to be accepted literally, it
will become virtually impossible to justify war as a response to the
isolated use of illegal force. Presumably, he derived his high standards
from the general principles of Anglo-American domestic criminal law
pertaining to self-defense. If this presumption is correct, it can only
demonstrate the danger inherent in drawing analogies from the domestic law to the international legal system. When a man is assaulted,
and his life imperiled, one can say that there is no moment for deliberation and no choice of means. But when an isolated act of illegal
force is committed against a State, there is sufficient room for deliberation. Moreover, in a well organized country the frontline command
will not unleash full-scale war (as distinct from reaction or reprisal)
by way of self-defense without first securing approval from army headquarters or, preferably, the government. This is a process that takes
more than a few moments, and particularly in a democratic State,
where the wheels of government turn slowly, the procedure may indeed
consume a long period of time. Jessup is of the opinion that
[t]elegraphic or radio communication between the officer and his
superiors can be taken as a counterpart of the impulses in the ner1 Trial of the Major War Criminals (1947) I.M.T. 207.
34 Levontin says about war: "It is unlimited in object in the sense that every war may
be regarded, potentially, as undertaken with a view to the total subjugation or debellatio
of the enemy. This is the chief distinction between war and reprisals." A. LVONTIN, TsM
MYTH OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 63-64 (1957).
33
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vous system of the individual whose brain instructs his arm to
35
strike.
However, in the international arena response to pressure is not reflexive; instead it is engendered by the contemplation and deliberation
disqualified by Webster.
It would appear that Webster's test must be reconstituted, permitting the waging of war in self-defense in response to an isolated
instance of armed attack, when justified by a reasonable combination
of urgency and necessity. Whether this reasonable combination exists
depends, of course, on the merits of each individual case. The two
elements of urgency and necessity are separate and distinct. From the
standpoint of urgency, war cannot be initiated in self-defense several
years after an isolated case of illegal use of force by another State. From
the viewpoint of necessity, if a single rifle shot is fired by an armed
soldier across the border from State A to State B, and hits a tree,
State B is scarcely in a position to respond with war. The situation
changes, however, when a thousand cannons are thundering; in this
regard, it can be said that quantity may turn into quality.
It should be pointed out that recourse to war in self-defense is a
right and not a duty. Consequently, even if a State is entitled to resort
to war by way of self-defense, it does not have to exercise that right.
For instance, it may choose not to respond to force with counterforce
because of the military supremacy of the attacking country. The State
subjected to an armed attack may also deem it adequate to respond
with less rather than with more force, as by undertaking reprisals.
However, the choice, or, if you please, the option, between war and
reprisal belongs only to the State under attack, and not to the aggressor
State. Once a State has used sufficient force to justify, in the light of
reasonable urgency and necessity, response by war as self-defense, it
cannot demand that the State subjected to attack diminish the quantum
of counterforce so as to respond merely with reprisal and not with war.
Thus, although the United States had an option to respond to the
attack on Pearl Harbor with war or reprisal, the Japanese did not have
a similar option (even had they desisted from further hostilities). This
is important to remember in relation to a possible thermonuclear strike
that is not followed by other military moves: the option of whether to
respond with war is given exclusively to the State which has been
attacked; a contrary rule would expose the victimized State to what
Herman Kahn calls "post-attack blackmail."3 6
31 P. JEssup, A MODERN LAw or NATIONS 164 (1950).

so H. KAHN,ON THEMoNuLEARI

WAR 171 (1960).
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Subjected to armed attacks by and from neighboring Arab countries on a daily basis, the State of Israel is continually confronted with
the option to respond to force with counterforce, and, if it so chooses,
to respond by reaction, reprisal, execution, or war. If the option since
June 1967 has been exercised in such a way that repetition of major
war has been avoided, this is simply due to what cynics may term "the
triumph of hope over experience." But in the long run, it would seem
that another full-scale war in the Middle East cannot be averted unless
an end is put to the "para-war" that persists. For the individual who
becomes a casualty on the borders of Israel, it is immaterial whether his
injury occurred in genuine war or in what lawyers may dub a "status
mixtus." Peace, as pointed out by Litvinov a generation ago, is indi37
visible.
PEACE: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE?

A.

The Security Council Resolution

The Arab-Israeli conflict, after so many years, has generated so
much heat and so little light that those seeking an end to the fighting
seem to be reaching for a star that is in a constant state of eclipse.
Groping their way in the dark, they tend to grasp at any handy support,
the most popular being the famous Security Council Resolution
No. 242 of November 22, 1967, which states:
The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the
Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by
war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which
every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance
of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which
should include the application of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in
the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect
for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence of every State in the area and their right to
37

Address by M. Litvinov, League of Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, July 1, 1936.
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live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from
threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international
waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including
the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain
contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement

and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in
accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Coundl on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as
soon as possible.38
One can hardly deny Resolution 242 the standing of an important
milestone in the long and arduous efforts to resolve the crisis in the
Middle East. At the same time, one should realize several shortcomings. The Resolution, by dint of its repetitive, if occasionally conflicting
exegeses, 39 is threatening to acquire the force of Scripture. Theoretically, however, it is not binding, in a legal sense, on the parties to
the dispute, inasmuch as it was adopted within the bounds of Chapter VI of the Charter. 40 Chapter VI, in contradistinction to Chapter
VII, does not empower the Security Council to issue decisions imposing legal obligations on United Nations members. Furthermore, in
practical terms, Resolution 242, imperceptibly but perhaps inexorably,
is losing its basic relevance. The most immediate and crucial problem
in the Middle East today is that, all along the cease-fire borders, fighting virtually never ceases. The cease-fire that brought the June 1967
war to an end came about as a result of a series of directives emanating
from the Security Council.41 The Council's call for a cease-fire is certainly to be considered as the most overriding and momentous step
taken by the United Nations since the outbreak of the war. The
November Resolution is complementary in character; it is supported
38 S.C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR, 1382d meeting 8 (1967).
39 For an illuminating examination of the text of the resolution, see Rosenne, supra
note 16, at 55 et seq.
4

0 See Shapira, The Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967- Its Legal

Nature and Implications, 4 IsR.r.L L. REv. 229 (1969).
41 See S.C. Res. 233, 22 U.N. SCOR, 1348th meeting (1967); S.C. Res. 234, 22 U.N.
SCOR, 1349th meeting (1967); S.C. Res. 235, 22 U.N. SCOR, 1350th meeting (1967).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[VCOL. 44:466

by the short-lived cease-fire, and makes sense only in the light of the
minimal tranquility prevailing in the Middle East in November of
1967. Since the underpinning of tranquility has been shattered in the
interim - by deliberate Arab resolve to observe the cease-fire no
longer - the position of Resolution 242 becomes ever more precarious.
Hence, unless the barometer of belligerency in the Middle East shows
a remarkable change for the better, the Resolution may, in time,
simply join the ranks of many previous dinosaur-like pronouncements
of the United Nations: interesting, impressive and irrelevant.
B. Just and Lasting Peace
Whatever the fate of Resolution 242 as a whole, one salient point
which transcends the details of the text is the emphasis, in the preamble
as well as in the heading of paragraph 1, upon the need for "a just
and lasting peace" in the Middle East. Peace between Israel and the
Arab countries is incontrovertibly the crux of the issue in the region;
what counts in the final analysis is not resolutions but solutions, not
a piece of paper but peace. Peace in what sense? To paraphrase what
President Franklin D. Roosevelt once said, peace should be regarded
not as an end to the last war, but as an end to the beginning of the
next one.42 Surely, so much blood has been shed between Arab and
Jew in half a century that no half-measures can conceivably be expected
to halt the chain reaction of force and counterforce, attack and counterattack. After decades of fighting, mutual distrust has reached such
proportions that fragmentary agreements to suspend hostilities are
doomed to become just another rung in the continuing process of
escalation. If experience is the name we give to our mistakes, consider
the experience of the last twenty years. The 1949 armistice arrangement
collapsed, the 1956 United Nations guarantees system failed, and
now, the 1967 cease-fire structure is disintegrating before our eyes. Only
a fresh beginning, a totally new framework, a new frame of mind, can
possibly create new opportunities. Peace is not the only alternative left
to the antagonists in the Middle East, but all others have been tried
and found wanting.
Durable peace cannot be encapsulated in a mere document calling
for the cessation of hostilities. A real peace treaty, in the meaning of
orthodox international law, 48 is required. And the treaty, to be suc-

cessful, must be accompanied by the proper state of mind. Going
through the motions will not suffice; attitudinizing will be fatal. The
42
43

Speech written by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jefferson Day broadcast, Apr. 13, 1945.
See 2 L. OPPENHniM, supra note 11, at 605-15.
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maintenance of a technical-legal state of belligerency is simply irreconcilable with peace. 44 A fortiori, actual measures in support of terrorist
activities, interference with navigation in international waterways, and,
for that matter, even economic warfare, are anathema to peace. Warlikepeace is a guarantee of war. To guarantee peace is more complicated,
but an absolutely essential element is the existence of an open frontier
between neighboring countries, which means daily contact, mutual
susceptibility to cross-currents of thought, and, finally, reciprocal respect for each other's point of view.
C. Direct Negotiations
The question of how to bring about peace in the Middle East
remains unanswered. It is popular to refer in this context to modality.
Perhaps, however, modality should simply be considered in terms of
the famous categories laid down by Kant: 45 peace is nonexistent at the
moment rather than existent; it is possible rather than impossible;
and it is necessary rather than contingent. The methodology is secondary in importance. Israel has always insisted on direct negotiations
as the best course of action, 46 and yet has fully supported the Jarring
mission. 47 It may be argued that direct negotiations are not always
the most effective first step towards a detente between hostile States,
but it seems that the total and adamant refusal of the Arab governments to entertain even the thought of ultimately having a face-to-face
confrontation with Israel demonstrates that they do not seriously contemplate peace. Every day lethal face-to-face confrontation between the
parties takes place at the front line and it is not easy to envisage an
about-face by remote control. Regardless of whether direct negotiations
are essential at this stage, the parties will eventually have to utilize
this method to solve their problems. In fact, direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab States have already taken place in 1948
and on subsequent occasions on the technical as well as on the political
level. And it appears that when they have to do so, and more importantly, when they desire to do so, the Arabs can confront the Israelis
not only in combat.
44 On whether or not the status of belligerency is in conformity with contemporary
international law, see N. FEINBERG, THE LEGALITy OF A "STATE OF WAR" AFTER THE CESSATION OF HOsTILrrms UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE COVENANT OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1961).
45 1. KANT, CRITOqUE OF PURE REASON 80 (Ist ed. 1781).

46 Oppenheim states: "The simplest means of settling State differences, and that to
which States as a rule resort before they make use of other means, is negotiation." 2 L.
OPPENHIrM, supra note 11, at 6-7.
47 This was established in paragraph 3 of Resolution 242. S.C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR,

1382d meeting 8 (1967).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 44:466

D. Big Power Intervention
Four Power conferences, Two Power conferences, and other
similar consultations, as long as they exclude the parties to the dispute,
are historical anachronisms which are destined to failure. The era of
the Concert of Europe, in which Super-Power Gunboat Diplomacy
predominated and the fortunes of the world were determined in the
inner councils of benevolent overlords, is over. Peace between Israel
and the Arab countries will be achieved not when a button is pressed
in Washington or Moscow, but only when both parties to the conflict
realize that it is they who must find a solution. When they are sufficiently disillusioned with outside attempts at peacemaking, peace may
cease to be an illusion.
E. Redemarcation of Boundaries
The issue of peace in the Middle East is closely linked to the
question of boundary redemarcation between Israel and the Arab
States. This controversy provides one of the best illustrations of the
vicious circle in which hostile States inevitably find themselves after
an extended period of mutual distrust. In a reign of peace, real estate
is not of paramount importance; but peace does not come with the speed
of light. Until the adversaries are completely assured that the conflict
is truly over, there is a tendency to insist upon the control of certain
strategic positions, which are regarded as essential to security. When
such security demands are not satisfied, apprehension only rises and
the exigency of retaining the vantage points looms larger. In the
case of the Middle East, the Arab governments at times seem to desire a return to conditions existent on the eve of the Six Day War. On
the other hand, Israel looks upon these very conditions as the cause of
the war, and, by avoiding future vulnerability, hopes to prevent a
repetition of the conflict. In fact, it should be noted that after every
major war in the Middle East, the Arabs have demanded the restoration
of the status quo ante the last bellum, while fully preparing for the
next one. As long as the Arabs continue to dream of eliminating Israel
totally from the map of the Middle East, Israel feels that it has certain
indispensable security needs. Accordingly, it does not relish the idea of
foregoing strategic gains - hard won in a war not of its own choosing
unless and until a new era of peace dawns. Israel is both prepared
and willing to negotiate the future of all newly acquired territories but only in peace talks. Even in the reunified capital of Jerusalem,
which had been ravaged by an unnatural division into two cities between 1948 and 1967, Israel does not seek to exercise exclusive control
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over the Holy Places of Islam and Christianity, and is favorably disposed
48
to a discussion of workable arrangements.
From the peace talks will emerge the agreed delineation of what
Resolution 242 terms "secure and recognized boundaries." Such
boundaries are not necessarily the cease-fire borders, but evidently
they do not overlap the pre-June 1967 demarcation lines either, for
those were neither secure nor recognized (as was demonstrated by the
war itself. Admittedly, the preamble of the Resolution does pay some
lip service to the concept of "the inadmissibility of acquisition of
territory by war," but this high-sounding principle is in conflict with the
historical record sanctioned by international law. If every State today
were to abandon those portions of its territory that were acquired as
a result of war, half of the globe would change hands. Moreover, if
acquisition by war is inadmissible, one might question what right the
Kingdom of Jordan had in the West Bank,49 and, in addition, what
right Egypt had in the Gaza Strip. It would appear that territory
which can be gained by the sword can also be lost by the sword.
To the extent that the concept of nonacquisition of territory by
war has any basis in general international law, it can be anchored
only to the well-known Stimson Doctrine, 0 which prescribes nonrecognition of "any situation, treaty or agreement" produced by an illegal
use of force. 1 The essence of the Doctrine is that a State should not
attain new rights under international law as a result of its breach of
that law: ex injuria jus non oritur.52 However, that Doctrine is only
relevant to the case in which the change in the situation is spawned by
an illegal use of force; it is inapplicable whenever the new state of
affairs stems from a legal use of force, i.e., successful self-defense. The
48 On the subject of Jerusalem, see E. LAuTERPAcHT, JERusALEr AND THE HOLY PLACES

(1968).
49 Indeed, Jordan's sovereignty over the West Bank is challenged by Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 IsAEsr. L. REv. 279, 281

(1968).
50 See Wright, Legal Aspects of the Middle East Situation, 33 LAW & CONTmP. PROB.
5, 24 (1968).

51 The original Stimson statement of January 1982 related to the obligations imposed
by the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the Renunciation of War. See I G. HACKWORTH, DIGEsT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 334 (1940). Shortly thereafter, the Assembly of the League of Nations
adopted a resolution adding a reference to the League's Covenant. LEAGUE OF NATIONS,
OFF. J. SPEc. Sw'. 101, at 87-88 (1932). See McNair, The Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recognition: A Note on its Legal Aspects, 14 BIrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 65-74 (1933).
52 The Stimson Doctrine, as formulated in terms of nonrecognition, is questionable
from an analytical viewpoint. The rule of nonrecognition of situations produced by illegal
use of force would be meaningful only on the basis of an underlying assumption that
recognition of such situations can somehow make an impact on the international legal
position (apparently by removing the stigma of unlawfulness). Since, however, the assumption is quite dubious, the issue of recognition or nonrecognition may very well be devoid
of legal significance. See H. KEsaN, supra note 5, at 293-94.
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aggressor may be barred from reaping the fruits of his crime against
peace, but the victim of an armed attack, in the event that he emerges
victorious, is not subject to the same disqualification. Since Israel
exercised self-defense in the Six Day War, its victory was not an
injuria, and a new jus would be eminently proper. 53
Finally, a word of caution must be added with regard to the future
of the territories under discussion. Large geographical areas cannot
be put into deep freeze; life goes on, and while hostilities continue,
and negotiations fail to materialize, numerous faits accomplis take
place almost as a matter of course. Fortifications are constructed, roads
are built, paramilitary settlements are established, and interests become
vested. The victor, in the words of Scott Fitzgerald, belongs to the
spoils. What was reversible in 1967 may prove difficult to reverse in
1970, and entirely irreversible in 1973. Consequently, if the Arabs are
sincerely interested in recovering most of their territorial losses, and
not merely in uttering self-fulfilling prophecies about Israeli expansion,
they must begin negotiating sooner rather than later.
F. Other Problems
It almost seems unnecessary to state that earnest negotiations between Israel and the Arab States, once commenced, can and should
encompass all outstanding issues. The whole spectrum of relations in
the Middle East should be exposed to close scrutiny, thereby providing, for the first time, an excellent opportunity to heal some festering
wounds. That the plight of the Arab refugees and displaced persons will
be high on the list of priorities is beyond question. This is a humanitarian problem that has not yet been solved, simply because of overriding political considerations. 54 Once the deck is cleared, there should be
no insurmountable obstacle to finding an acceptable formula for accomplishing the integration of the refugees into a productive life in
the Middle East.
CONCLUSION

The main thing is for the Arabs to awaken from their day-dreams,
and to correct their optical illusion that Israel does not exist. They
must realize that "sometimes the faculty of judgment is misled by the
influence of imagination."15 In brief, they must learn to accept reality.
With less emotion, there is a good chance for motion toward a viable
peace.
53 "As against a State in the position of Israel, acting in lawful self-defence, the principle ex iniuria non oritur ius is simply not applicable." J. STONE, No PEAcE-NO WAR
32 (1969).
54 On the subject of the refugees, see REFUGEES IN THE MIDDLE EAst: A SOLUTION IN
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(1967).

55 I. KANT, supra note 45, at 295.

